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Abstract
This work develops an integrated model for optimal asset allocation
in commercial banks that incorporates uncertain liquidity constraints
that are currently ignored by RAROC and EVA models. While the
economic proﬁt accounts for the opportunity cost of risky assets, what
may even incorporate a market liquidity premium, it neglects the risk
of failure due to the lack of suﬃcient funds to cope with unexpected
cash demands arising from bank runs, drawdowns, or market, credit
and operational losses, what may happen along with credit rationing
episodes or systemic level dry ups. Given a liquidity constraint that
can incorporate these factors, there is a failure probability Pf that the
constraint will not hold, resulting in a value loss for the bank, repre-
sented by a stochastic failure loss e Lf. By assuming that bankers are
risk neutral in their decision about the size of the liquidity cushion,
the economic proﬁt less the possible losses due to the lack of liquid-
ity is optimized, resulting in a short-term asset allocation model that
integrates market, credit and operational risks in the liquidity manage-
ment of banks. Even though a general approach is suggested through
simulation, I provide a closed form solution for Pf, under some sim-
plifying assumptions, that may be useful for research and supervision
purposes as an indicator of the liquidity management adequacy in the
banking system. I also suggest an extreme value theory approach for
the estimation of e Lf, departing from other liquidity management mod-
els that use a penalty rate over the demand of cash that exceeds the
availability of liquid resources. The model was applied to Brazilian
banks data resulting in gains over the optimization without liquid-
ity considerations that are robust under several tests, giving empirical
indications that the model may have a relevant impact on the value
creation in banks.
Keywords: Liquidity risk, liquidity management, asset allocation, RAROC,
EVA.
JEL: G21, G32.
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31 Introduction
Risk management in ﬁnancial institutions is a subject that has been refreshed
by the recent and increasing interest following Basel I and Basel II Accords
discussions. Nevertheless, even if an institution maintains a proper level of
economic capital to protect its depositors and creditors, adequately account-
ing for market, credit and operational risks, two variables may fall far from
expected: the operations’ demand for cash, and the availability of funding
and short-term resources. The ﬁrst may be aﬀected by sudden cash needs,
such as bank runs, drawdowns, and market, credit or operational losses.
Unexpected values for the latter may occur in the case of credit rationing
episodes among banks1 or systemic level dry ups. Both situations lead to
losses that may come from the need to sell assets at unfavorable prices, to
obtain funding at unreasonably high costs or to forego proﬁtable investment
opportunities. In extreme cases, when the failure scales up to bankruptcy,
the shareholders may loose all equity plus bankruptcy costs. Thus, liquidity,
or the lack of it, brings a failure risk that is neglected by solely marking
banks’ assets to market.
The liquidity risk in ﬁnancial institutions is usually categorized as market
liquidity risk or funding liquidity risk2. The ﬁrst one is the risk of loss due
to changes in the value of assets caused by the low liquidity of the markets
where they are traded. The funding liquidity risk is the risk of loss due to the
bank’s lack of enough liquid resources to cope with cash needs. This lack of
resources may come either from the unavailability of funding sources, or from
the impossibility to realize an asset for cash. This is usually the case of credit
portfolios, except, of course, in the case of securitization or loan sales, but
these processes take time and if they are not yet in an advanced stage, they
1Before the US mortgage crisis started in 2007, credit rationing episodes were usually
discussed with respect to banks’ customers and not among banks, so that this statement
may need some clariﬁcation: credit rationing among banks is the limitation of the amount
of money that a bank would accept to lend to another bank, regardless of the interest rate
charged, in the spirit of Bhattacharya and Fulghieri (1994). In their work, Battacharya
and Fulguieri present a model in which there can be a maximum amount for interbank
lending, regardless of the interest rate, as the short-term allocation of liquid assets in the
bank that borrows money is a private information. The recent credit rationing episodes
triggered by the mortgage crisis oﬀer further evidence that the interbank credit market
provides only partial protection against liquidity risk.
2There are some divergencies in literature about the exact meaning of funding liquidity
risk, as between Gup and Kolari (2005, chap. 11) and Koch and MacDonald (2000, chap.
3). Saunders and Cornett (2006, chap. 17), on the other hand, use a classiﬁcation that
considers the impact on liquidity caused by the asset and liability structure, dividing
liquidity risks in asset-side liquidity risks and liabilities-side liquidity risks. The deﬁnition
used in this work follows Koch and MacDonald (2000), Jorion (2001), and BIS (2006b).
4cannot be executed in an arbitrarily small amount of time. In less developed
credit markets, such as in Brazil, this is an even bigger concern. Anyway, in
many situations the factors that cause losses in both cases are common (BIS,
2006b), since the bank would not sell assets at unfavorable prices unless there
was a good reason, such as the payment of pressing liabilities.
While much attention has been paid to the modeling and pricing of mar-
ket liquidity risk, and to the development of sophisticated capital adequacy
models, the same has not happened with the funding liquidity risk and the
liquidity management in ﬁnancial institutions. Most of the literature about
practical issues in liquidity management is in ﬁnancial institutions and risk
management textbooks,3 or in regulators’ documents, such as those issued
by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) or by Central Banks.
Most textbooks and regulators’ recommendations, such as BIS (2006b)
and BIS (2000), despite being able to guide a minimum level of liquidity and
a responsible liquidity management, do not indicate an optimal liquidity level
because they are dissociate from investment decisions, as opposed to theoret-
ical liquidity management models that frequently use an objective function
associated to the ﬁnancial performance in order to ﬁnd the ideal liquidity
level. Traditional liquidity management involves the mapping, estimation
and simulation of inﬂows and outﬂows within some time horizon, including
safety margins and contingency plans to deal with exceptional losses and dis-
bursements. The separation from the investment decision makes it diﬃcult
to assess objectively how much cash is too much, hindering bank’s ability to
seize proﬁtable opportunities, and how much is too few, making the risk of
losses higher than acceptable in exchange for the increased returns on illiq-
uid assets. As a result, there is a gap between theoretical developments in
liquidity management and what is actually used in practice by commercial
banks, and the decision about the optimal liquidity level relies much more
on art and professional experience than on science and well speciﬁed decision
processes.
According to Xavier and Rochet (1999, chap. 8), there are two theoretical
paradigms to liquidity management in ﬁnancial institutions. One of them,
proposed by Ho and Saunders (1981), applies to banks the analysis of Ho and
Stoll (1980) for the management of market makers’ inventory of assets. In
the second paradigm, the bank’s proﬁt is modeled as a function of the total
resources that are kept as reserves, R, that pay a return r. The remaining
resources, which are obtained through the deposits D, are used to make
3Among the several texts available, it is possible to cite: Hastings (2006), Saunders
and Cornett (2006), Gup and Kolari (2005), Banks (2004), Van Greuning and Bratanovic
(2003), Bessis (2002), Koch and MacDonald (2000), Kidwell et al. (1997), Rose (1996),
Hempel et al. (1994).
5illiquid loans that receive the interest rate rL. If the total withdrawals after
some time, represented by the stochastic variable e x, are bigger than the value
of reserves, the bank pays a punitive rate rP over the diﬀerence between
withdrawals and reserves. This way, the bank’s proﬁt would be given by
Π(R) = rL(D − R) + rR − rPE[Max(0,e x − R)], and the optimal level of
reserves is obtained from the maximization of Π(R).
Particularly in the second paradigm, the greatest diﬃculty is to correctly
incorporate the opportunity costs associated to a great variety of operations
realized by banks, with exposition to several risks that stem from uncertain
returns. Other issue that can be raised is the use of a linear relation between
the margin by which the cash demands exceed the availability of resources
and the cost incurred by the lack of liquidity. It is possible to argue that
the risk of extreme losses, or even bank’s bankruptcy, may signiﬁcatively
inﬂuence the expected loss because of the lack of liquidity.
The model proposed in this work contributes to the evolution of the liq-
uidity management practice by adopting the second paradigm, but with the
use of the underlying concept of economic proﬁt on RAROC and EVA mod-
els, largely used by ﬁnancial institutions, as the objective function of the
optimization, since RAROC and EVA models are recognized by their abil-
ity to adequately incorporate opportunity costs throughout all operations
of a ﬁnancial institution (Schroeck, 2002, chap. 6). The idea is to develop
a consistent, ﬂexible and comprehensive model that correctly incorporates
the risks and complexities of banking activities, but still allows for a grad-
ual and evolutive implementation, resulting in lower costs to introduce the
new model, including training and disturbances to normal activities of the
institution. A great deal of care was taken throughout the description of
the model in order to use variables that can be directly related to manage-
rial information, instead of using stylized and abstract variables, what also
facilitates the conversion of the theoretical results into real applications.
In addition, the expected loss was modeled in two ways: one of them
through a linear function of the lacking liquid resources, as in the basic
paradigm described above, and the other based on the Extreme Value Theory,




The liquidity constraint faced by commercial banks depends on the chosen
short-term allocation between liquid and illiquid assets. The bank will possi-
bly lose money if the lack of suﬃcient resources results in the violation of the
liquidity constraint, even if the bank is still solvent. Tradable or liquid assets,
AL, for the purposes of this work, are all those assets that could be realized
for money (i.e., that can be used to make payments and redeem obligations)
at reasonable prices in the time horizon δt. Non-tradable or illiquid assets,
AI, are all those that cannot be realized for money in δt, or that could be
realized at punitive discounts (ﬁre-sales). As a simpliﬁcation, one can think
AL as the trading book and AI as the banking book,4 but the deﬁnition used
in this work does not imply that some classes of assets are liquid and some
are not. Simply put, AL is the total amount of assets that can be amassed to
redeem obligations in the time δt. One should notice that if a large institu-
tion tries to negotiate too much of an otherwise liquid security, it will suﬀer
rather high discounts marginally, so that not all of the security’s holdings
will be considered liquid. Even cash may be considered illiquid if it cannot
be timely available for logistics reasons, for example, as it is the case of cash
in ATMs. Therefore, the banks’ asset allocation decision in the short-term
should consider the choice of a portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets, given
some cash and cash equivalent assets available for allocation after reasonably
predictable cash demands are provisioned for use in δt. Part of this avail-
able cash must be used to protect the institution from liquidity compromising
events, and part will enhance proﬁts at increased liquidity, credit and market
risks.
The expected economic proﬁt of an investment I with stochastic return e r
is given by E(e Π) = I × [E(e r) − R], where E(·) represents the mathematical
expectation of a random variable and R is the risk adjusted opportunity cost
of the investment. If the expected economic proﬁt is positive, E(e Π) > 0, the
investment should be done and it increases the bank’s value. Conceptually,
this is the analysis done in EVA models, which is equivalent to require that
E(e r) > R, which, by its turn, is the acceptance criterium of investments in
4In regulation and bank accounting terminology, "a trading book consists of positions in
ﬁnancial instruments and commodities held either with trading intent or in order to hedge
other elements of the trading book" (BIS, 2006a, p. 158). The banking book corresponds
to the remaining assets that are not in the trading book, usually related to traditional
bank activities, as loans. As the trading book corresponds to tradable positions, in many
countries, including Brazil, it is registered in the balance sheet by its market value, while
the banking book is registered by its cost.
7RAROC model, given a correct assessment of expected return and opportu-
nity cost. The risk of loss due to the prompt unavailability of liquid resources
is related to a failure probability, Pf, which is a function of the short-term
allocation between liquid and illiquid assets. Additionally, once the failure
takes place, there is a stochastic loss given by e Lf.
It is necessary to establish some hypothesis about the behavior of eco-
nomic agents in order to justify the choice of the investment selection cri-
terium that will be modiﬁed to include the eﬀects of the lack of liquidity. It
is assumed that such economic agents represents shareholders of commercial
banks, which ultimately deﬁne the behavior of the bank as economic agent,5
and that they are rational and risk neutral regarding short-term allocation
decisions. Long-term resource allocation and strategic decisions, which are
related to how the bank makes business and compete in the market, are not
reached by this model and can include risk aversion. Implicitly, it means that
the investment opportunities in illiquid assets are those in usual "projects"
of the bank, as loan oﬀers to target markets. The allocation decision of risk
adjusted economic capital among divisions incorporates strategic decisions
and reﬂects the institution’s appetite for risk, but once deﬁned, short-term
investments in liquid assets represent simply a liquidity cushion or reservoir
that the bank keeps exclusively because of the liquidity risk or the lack of
proﬁtable investment opportunities. In summary, the only function of this
liquidity cushion is the protection against unexpected cash demands. It is
not used to adjust the risk and return proﬁle of the institution, and the def-
inition of this proﬁle is considered a strategic decision that is exogenous to
this model, what makes the risk-neutral behavior a reasonable assumption.
This assumption is only necessary because the expected loss due to the lack
of liquidity will be deducted from the expected economic proﬁt.
At the beginning o the i-th period, the bank is assumed to have Ai
L liquid
assets and Ai
I illiquid assets. Nevertheless, it is necessary to distinguish from
all liquid assets those whose allocation is discretionary in the short-term,
Ai
L,D, after one subtracts from Ai
L the cash and cash equivalent securities
required to take strategic and long-term positions in liquid assets and to
make predictable disbursements in δt, net from all predictable cash inﬂows.
This includes adjustments for:
• the cash received from fees and matched positions, which earn ﬁxed
spreads;
• operational costs, hedging costs and interest expenses;
5For the purposes of this work, agency problems are being disregarded.
8• taxes that will be eﬀectively collected in δt;
• required deposits, exchange margins, guarantees, indemnity deposits,
and any other eﬀective pledges of liquid resources;
• the cash committed to either ongoing or new long-term investments,
which are evaluated as usual6;
• strategic and long-term positions in tradable securities, usually set by
an Asset and Liability Committee (ALCO), Ai
L,ALCO;
• the cash required (received) to redeem (increase) outstanding debt,
whether required by contract or as a long-term funding decision;
• the cash that will be used to pay dividends (or any other cash transfer
to equity holders) or will be received from the issuance of new shares.
The economic proﬁt of the chosen allocation of the resources Ai
L,D by the










• wi is a vector of weights corresponding to the proportions of Ai
L,D
invested in liquid assets, wi
L, or in illiquid assets, wi
I, during the i-th
period: wi = [wi
I wi
L] ;
• e ri is the vector of stochastic total returns of illiquid, e ri
I, and liquid
assets, e ri
L, in the i-th period: e ri = [e ri
I e ri
L] . It is assumed that the
market liquidity risk is embedded in the stochastic behavior of the
returns on liquid assets;
• Ri is the vector of risk adjusted opportunity costs of investments in
illiquid, Ri
I, and liquid assets, Ri
L: Ri = [Ri
I Ri
L] .
It is also assumed that e ri is independent from the choice of wi. This
assumption has distinct consequences for liquid and illiquid assets. In the
case of liquid assets, this means that the bank does not individually aﬀect
market clearing prices, i.e. it is price taker. In the case of illiquid assets,
as loan portfolios, this means that the increase in credit operations does not
occur at the expense of the credit quality of new clients.
6Long-term investments are usually evaluated through discounted cash ﬂow and real
options models.
9Additionally, the vector of stochastic total returns may be split in two
parts: one representing capital gains, and other representing the cash yield
in the period, so that we may write:
e r







V is the vector of stochastic capital gains, the percent change in the
value of the asset after any cash payments, which is given by: e ri
V =
[e ri
V,I 0] , where it is assumed that the total return on liquid assets
can be completely represented as a cash yield;
• e ri
C is the vector of stochastic cash yields (cash generated in the i-th
period by invested monetary unit) on liquid assets, e ri
C,L, and on illiquid
assets, e ri
C,I : e ri
C = [e ri
C,I e ri
C,L] .
The problem of economic proﬁt maximization would be trivial in this set-
ting without a liquidity constraint. One should expect that liquid markets
have more participants that make a greater deal of eﬀort to collect informa-
tion, so that they are more eﬃcient in the sense of the Market Eﬃciency
Hypothesis, at least in its semi-strong form (Fama, 1991), in such a way
that positive economic proﬁt opportunities should be rapidly spotted. The
resulting increase in the demand for "cheap" assets would rapidly make them
more expensive and eliminate proﬁt opportunities, making these opportuni-
ties scarce. The opacity and low accessibility of less liquid markets should
allow the availability of more positive economic proﬁt opportunities. There-
fore, the chances are that E(e ri
L−Ri
L) < E(e ri
I −Ri
I). Under these conditions,
a risk neutral agent would see no trade-oﬀ between liquid and illiquid assets,
and the optimization would have a corner solution: the bank should invest
resources on illiquid assets as long as positive economic proﬁt opportunities
exist, keeping only the excess of available resources over proﬁtable opportu-
nities as liquid assets. This is, in fact, the result that would be obtained by
using RAROC and EVA models without any liquidity constraint.
Nevertheless, given the possibility of losses due to the lack of resources to
fulﬁll short-term obligations or to make long-term investments, the economic
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10• e F i represents the stochastic funding opportunities in the short-therm
during the i-th period;
• e Ui
C is the uncertain demand for cash in δt.
Expression (3) means that the total liquid resources available at the be-
ginning of the period, plus those generated in δt, and plus the funding oppor-
tunities in the i-th period, e F i, must be at least equal to the immediate and
unexpected cash demand e Ui
C. For simplicity, it is assumed that the return on
the inventory of illiquid assets is equal to the return on new illiquid assets.
This assumption may be relaxed simply by using a diﬀerent stochastic return
for Ai
I. Likewise, it is assumed that the return on ALCO positions is equal
to the return on other liquid positions.
In order to further clarify the meaning of this liquidity constraint, some
comments are worthwhile. As a general rule, the terms on the left hand
side of the constraint are cash sources, while the terms on the right hand
side represent the consumption of or demand for cash. As changes in the
inventory of assets and liabilities may represent either sources or demands
for cash, and as even some ﬁnancial instruments may generate positive as
well as negative cash ﬂows, such as swaps, the side of the inequality in which
these ﬂows are modeled are not important from a numeric point of view.
What should dictate the choice is the ease in modeling and the coherence.
As a suggestion, e F i may represent funding opportunities through interbank
lending (including funds provided by the Central Bank), nonredeemable short
term deposits, short-term debt, and repurchase agreements. Funding through
savings accounts, demand accounts, and other redeemable short-term debt
are considered potential sources of immediate and unexpected cash demands,
and, exactly because of this, should be included in e Ui
C. As a matter of fact,
it is the potentially extreme value of e Ui
C, stemming from bank fragility, that
gives relevance to the liquidity management in commercial banks.
Several sources of risk are embedded in restriction (3). Unexpected losses
with credit or market operations would be reﬂected in the realization of
e ri
C. Bank runs, margin calls and drawdowns would be accounted for in the
realization of e Ui
C, while interbank credit rationing episodes would reduce
the realized value of e F i. Systemic level dry ups can aﬀect both e ri
C and e F i.
Finally, given the broad deﬁnition of operational losses, they may be reﬂected
in the realization of any of the uncertainty sources.7
7For example, the realized value of e ri
C may be lower because of a faulty credit rating
system, e Ui
C may be aﬀected by a fraud or by the unexpected loss of a law suit, and image
compromising problems may aﬀect both e Ui
C and e Fi.
11It is important to point out that the losses from operational, credit, and
market risks are not, by themselves, the main concern. Capital allocation
models already deal with these risks. The focus of this work is the loss that
comes from the lack of liquidity triggered by a harmful event, that may be
related to market, credit or operational losses, but is not restricted to them.
There is a failure probability P i
f that the relation (3) will not hold, and in
this case the bank will fail to pay some of its obligations, will have to sell
assets or obtain short-term funding at unfavorable conditions, will forego
proﬁtable investment opportunities, or will be forced to change long-term
strategies. If the failure occurs, the bank’s value should be reduced by a
certain amount, corresponding to a stochastic failure cost e Li
f, and there may
be also the possibility of bankruptcy if the loss is too extreme. Even if the loss
itself does not make the bank insolvent, it can aﬀect the institution’s market
position, blocking the access to short-term resources, or causing panic among
depositors. The resulting catastrophic run would lead the bank to insolvency.
The probability P i
f changes according to the short-term allocation de-
cision wi, so that the liquidity management problem, in the context of re-
source allocation, may be seen as an economic proﬁt maximization problem













Figure 1: Allocation decision with liquidity risk.
It is also important to identify some restrictions to the allocation. Ini-
tially, it is not always possible to assign any volume of investments to any
asset. There may be restrictions related to market opportunities and tradable






This means that the invested volume cannot surpass available investment




12the restriction on the volume invested in illiquid assets, and Oi
L represents
the restriction on the volume invested in liquid assets, even though, most
probably, the restriction will be stronger to illiquid assets. For example, it
is much harder to expand credit operations to prime clients than to increase
positions on government issued securities, since the ﬁrst depends on the de-
mand for credit, market share, product development strategies and so on,
while the latter depends only on a buying order.
Finally, it is also necessary that:
w
i1
> = 1 (5)
and
w
i = 0, (6)
where 1, 0 ∈ R2 are, respectively, vectors of ones and zeros.
Conditions (5) and (6) apply because any allocation must add up to
exactly the total amount of available resources and because funding is treated
separately. Though, leveraged or short positions are allowed inside the class
of liquid assets as long as they are part of an investment strategy.
2.2 The Failure Probability
Given the generality of the liquidity constraint, the most ﬂexible and simple
way to estimate P i
f is through simulation methods, either Monte Carlo, based
on multivariate models for the statistic distribution of the random variables
in (3); or historical, through the re-sampling of historical data about returns,
funding opportunities and unexpected demands for liquid resources, assum-
ing that there is enough data available. Such simulation must be done for
a ﬁnite set W ⊂ R2 of chosen values for the vector wi, so that it is pos-
sible to establish a functional relation P i
f(wi) : W → Pi, where Pi ⊂ R
is the set of failure probabilities simulated for each weight vector wi in W.
Though, under certain simplifying assumptions, it is possible to obtain a
closed expression for the failure probability.
In order to obtain this closed expression, it is necessary to limit the quan-
tity of continuous distributions that need to be parameterized in (3). Dis-
crete distribution models, on the other hand, may be added without making
it impossible to obtain a closed solution, even though they add to the ﬁnal
expression complexity. In this simpliﬁcation, deposits and returns are contin-
uous random variables, while the funding capacity in the short-term follows
a discrete model. The assumptions used in this work are:
• the exceptional demands for cash correspond to decreases in the volume
of deposits;
13• the returns on assets, in annualized and continuous rates, follow a mul-
tivariate normal distribution;
• the variation in the volume of deposits is independent on the current
volume of deposits, in such a way that the variation itself, and not
the percent variation, has a normal distribution, even though negative
jumps are allowed;
• the availability of funding resources in the short-term is a Bernoulli
experiment, with availability F + in case of success, and F − in case of
failure;
• the correlation between a negative jump in the variation of the volume
of deposits and the lack of funding opportunities in the short-term is
1;8
• the distribution of the variation in the volume of deposits is independent
on the distributions of assets’ cash yields;
• the stochastic processes generating the random variables are stationary.
If the matrix notation is removed, e Ui
C is exchanged for the negative vari-
ation in the volume of deposits between this period and the next, −δ e Di =
Di − e Di+1, and remembering that the total return on liquid assets, e ri
L, is as-
sumed to be equal to the cash yield on liquid assets, e rC,L, then the liquidity




























L,D + e F
i ≥ −δ e D
i. (7)
In order to obtain the probability that the restriction is violated, it is
necessary to estimate the parameters of the distributions of e ri
L, e ri
C,I, e F i and
δ e Di, according to the assumptions above.
In the case of e ri
L and e ri
C,I, as a normal distribution is assumed, the pa-
rameters to me estimated are mean and variance. In order to facilitate the
interpretation of the results and the algebraic manipulations, these param-
eters will be estimated in annualized continuous rates, such that the time
horizon δt represents a fraction of the year.
8The simultaneous occurrence of negative jumps in deposits and restrictions in the
funding opportunities tries to mimic the eﬀects of a liquidity crisis, either systemic of
speciﬁc to a particular bank, in which the best informed creditors and depositors react,
promptly and simultaneously, restricting credit and withdrawing resources.
14The mean µi
C,I of the random variable e ri
C,I, in an annualized continuous



















where n is the number of periods used in the estimation, and rev
i−j
I represents
the historical values of the revenues, prior to the period i, that are accrued
to the illiquid assets.10 As discussed in footnote 4, page 7, liquid assets are
usually marked to market, while illiquid assets are registered by its cost value.
This way, it is possible to use historical values of revenues over the total of
illiquid assets by the time the revenues were generated to represent the cash
yield of illiquid assets.
Thus, the standard deviation σi
C,I of the distribution of continuous cash























As the stochastic processes that generate each period’s random variables
are assumed to be stationary in order to simplify the exposition, there is no
reason why to analyze the composition of the portfolio. Though, it is obvious
that a practical implementation of this model should take this composition
into account. If the asset allocation inside the general class of illiquid assets
changed substantially throughout the estimation window, it will be necessary
to estimate the parameters for each asset in the portfolio of illiquid assets, as
well as the correlation matrix, such that it is possible to obtain an estimate
of global parameters for the current proportion of each asset, according to
the Modern Portfolio Theory (Markowitz, 1952). The process is analogous
to what will be done later, when the parameters of the portfolio of liquid and
illiquid assets will be estimated.
Other adjustment that should be done when the stationarity assumption
is ruled out is the use of an autoregressive estimation of the standard devi-
ation through, for example, EWMA (Exponentially Weighted Moving Aver-
9The results discussed in this section are well known from the theory of measure,
probability, and stochastic processes. A basic, but classic reference is Hull (2003). Other
more advanced, but still very accessible references are Albanese and Campolieti (2006),
Klebaner (2004), and Bingham and Kiesel (2004).
10These revenues are, basically, bank’s credit portfolio income, but may include rents,
dividends from strategic long-term positions in equity, among others.
15age) or GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity)
models.11
Assuming that the value of liquid assets is marked to market, the average
µi









































The comment about changes in the composition of the portfolio during the
estimation window also applies to the broad class of liquid assets. Actually,
in this case it is even more likely that the portfolio has changed substantially,
even for a smaller estimation window.
As by hypothesis the returns are multivariate normally distributed, the
return distribution of a portfolio of these assets is also normal. In order to
obtain the distribution parameters of a portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets,













































































as the weights of illiquid and liquid assets, respectively, in the generation
of cash, it is ﬁnally possible to estimate the parameters of mean, µi
C, and
standard deviation, σi
C, of the resulting cash yield:
11There are several good texts that discuss the volatility estimation in detail, such as





























Moreover, for the following discussion Ai
C will be deﬁned as the portfolio






















Given an interest rate r continuously compounded during a period T, it
is possible to approximate it, for a suﬃciently large number of capitalization






mT = erT. Thus, if the time horizon δt is
suﬃciently small, the number of δt intervals throughout a year, given by 1
δt,
will be suﬃciently big and we will have (1 + rδt)
1 ano
δt ≈ er×1 ano, that is, the
rate at each interval may be approximated by r
m = rδt.
This means that the cash yield of Ai






, may be modeled through a mean variation µi
Cδt, given by the
continuously compounded annual cash yield of Ai
C multiplied by a fraction of
the year δt. To this mean variation it is possible to add a random component
σi
Ce εi√






will have a normal distribution with mean given by µi
Cδt and
standard deviation given by σi
C
√
δt. In other words, it is possible to model
the cash yield on Ai








































By using (19) in (7), the liquidity restriction becomes:
δ e A
i





L,D − e F
i. (21)
Regarding the models of δ e Di and e F i, as it is assumed that a negative
jump of deposits and the reduction of funding opportunities occur simul-
taneously (what, in discrete time, means that they both take place in the
17same interval δt), both processes will be modeled together through the pro-
cess δ e F i
S, which represents all short-term funding opportunities in δt: savings
accounts, demand accounts, issuance of short-term debt, repurchase agree-
ments, interbank lending, and so on, in such a way that:
δ e F
i
S = δ e D
i + e F
i. (22)
By hypothesis, the change in the volume of deposits e Di follows a simple
jump-diﬀusion process, where jumps are constant and negative, representing
bank runs. In order to jointly model the decrease in funding opportunities
and negative jumps in deposits, the jump Ji in δ e Di will include a component
that represents a decrease in deposits, Ji
D, plus a component that represents












Therefore, the stochastic diﬀerential of deposits, including the funding











D is the drift component of the model, σi
D is the diﬀusion component
and de Qt is the stochastic diﬀerential of a Poisson process with intensity λ,
representing the average number of jumps in the period of one year.































t1 − e Q
t0), (25)
Because of (23) and (25), (22) may be rewritten as:
δ e F
i
S = δ e D
i + e F




as the possibility of decrease in funding opportunities was incorporated to
δ e Di.
If the time interval δt is small enough so that the probability of more



















i, with probability (1 − e
−λt).
(27)
18Note that the probability of exactly one jump is λδt × e−λδt, and not
1 − e−λδt, but in order to both probabilities sum up to exactly one, it is
assumed that the diﬀerence is negligible for the time interval δt used.
If we deﬁne e Qδt = e Qt1 − e Qt0, the probability of more than one jump is
P(e Qδt ≥ 2) = 1 − e−λδt − e−λδtλδt, which is less than 1/5000 for any λ up
to 1 and any δt up to 1/52, and less than 1/1000 for any λ up to 0.5 and δt
up to 1/12. If the likelihood of more than one jump is greater than desired,































i, w. p. (1 − e
−λt − λδt × e
−λδt),
(28)
and again, it is assumed that the probability of three of more jumps is neg-
ligible. The same logic can be used to include as many jumps as desired,
simply by using
P(e Q




There is an extensive literature about jump-diﬀusion stochastic processes,
with various levels of sophistication, as well as about the estimation of its
parameters (see Cai and Hong, 2003). In this simpliﬁed model, with constant
jump, a moment matching estimation will be used. It is only assumed that
a historical series of the changes on the short-term obligations is available.






































































































i(λδt − e Q
δt)
i3
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given that for e εi: E(e εi) = 0, E[(e εi)2] = 1, E[(e εi)3] = 0, and E[(e εi)4] =
3, and for e Qδt: E(e Qδt) = λδt, E[(e Qδt)2] = λδt, E[(e Qδt)3] = λδt, and
E[(e Qδt)4] = 3(λδt)2 + λδt. In order to obtain the above results, it was
also necessary to assume the independence between e εi and e Qδt, such that
E(e εi e Qδt) = E(e εi)E(e Qδt).






































S , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, represents a sample of n historical values of the
change in short-term liabilities, it is possible to use Fisher’s k statistics
(Fisher, 1928) as non-biased estimators of the central moments of δ e F i
S:
b E(δ e F
i








b µ3(δ e F
i
S) = k3 =
n2
(n − 1)(n − 2)
m3; (43)
b µ4(δ e F
i
S) = k4 =
n2[(n + 1)m4 − 3(n − 1)m2
2]
(n − 1)(n − 2)(n − 3)
. (44)
By combining estimates (41) to (44) with the results (33) to (36), it is pos-
sible to obtain the following estimates for the parameter of the distribution




b µ4(δ e F i
S) − 3b σ2(δ e F i
S)
b µ3(δ e F i
S)
; (45)
b λ = −








b σ2(δ e F i






b E(δ e F i
S) + b Jib λδt
δt
. (48)
From (21), (26), and (27), and using the independence between δ e Di and
δ e Ai




















L,D w. p. (1 − e
−λδt),
(49)
where δ e F i
S,NJ and δ e F i
S,J represent random variables whose distributions cor-
respond to the distribution of δ e F i
S conditional to e Qδt = 0 (no jump), and
e Qδt = 1 (exactly one jump), respectively. As δ e Ai
C, δ e F i
S,NJ, and δ e F i
S,J are
normal and independent random variables, the distribution of the sum of
random variables in (49) is also normal, with parameters given by:
δ e A
i








































Finally, for suﬃciently small optimization intervals, as discussed previ-



































where Φ(x) is the cumulative probability function of the standard normal
distribution.
2.3 The Loss Given a Failure
The modeling of the failure loss in the case of violation of the liquidity con-
straint brings additional challenges. The information needed to obtain the
failure probability, either through simulation or through a parametric model,
is used in a daily basis and is largely available to the ﬁnancial institution’s
management, and even to regulators in less detail. The idea that a loss, by
the time it is recorded, should be assigned to the lack of liquidity, though,
is not usual, and it becomes even more complex because failure losses have
multiple distinct origins and natures, as the losses because of foregone in-
vestments and the forced realization of assets. If it is added to this set of
issues the fact that considerable losses are hopefully rare, one can conclude
that the diﬃculties to estimate failure losses resemble those involved in the
estimation of operational losses. One of the main concerns in deploying op-
erational losses models is the lack of enough historical information or reliable
models for its statistical distribution (Marshall, 2001, chap. 6 and 7). In this
context, the use of the Extreme Value Theory12 looks like a natural path to
establish a statistical model for e Lf.
The Extreme Value Theory seeks to ﬁnd limiting distributions to the tails
of unknown distributions, just like the Central Limit Theorem ensures that
the limiting distribution of the mean of a sequence of independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables is the normal distribution. According
to McNeil et al. (2005, chap. 7), there are, roughly, two main approaches.
12A classical reference on Extreme Value Theory applied to ﬁnance is Embrechts et al.
(1997). A good reference for the statistical aspects described here is McNeil et al. (2005).
22The ﬁrst one describes the distributions of maximums (or minimums) of a
block of data, such that if there is a non-degenerate limiting distribution to
the maximum of a sequence of n independent realizations drawn from the
same distribution, then the cumulative probability function of the maximum









which is called Generalized Extreme Value Distribution, GEV, where ξ is a
shape parameter.
The second approach models the limiting distribution of losses above a
certain level u in a group of n losses. As n increases, if there is a GEV for the
distribution of the block maximum, then the cumulative probability distri-


















where β > 0 and x ≥ 0 when ξ ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ x ≤ −
β
ξ when ξ < 0.
McNeil et al. (2005) argue that this second approach is more economic in
the use of data and suggest a maximum likelihood estimation method of the
parameters. As discussed at the beginning of this section, the availability
of data about the losses due to the lack of liquidity is, at best, limited, and
therefore, the second approach seems to be the best choice.
In order to estimate the parameters in (54), consider the set of historical
data about n losses due to the lack of liquidity, given by {L1,L2,...,Ln},
and a subset {Lu,1,Lu,2,...,Lu,Nu} of this set, containing the Nu losses that
surpassed the level u. Deﬁne Yj = Lu,j − u as the loss in excess of the level
u and gξ,β(x) as the probability density function of the GPD. The logarithm



















and should be maximized subject to β > 0 and 1 + ξ
Yj
β > 0 for every j,
resulting in estimations of the parameters ξ and β. It is assumed that the
23losses are independent and identically distributed, but according to McNeil
et al. (2005), it is still possible to obtain good point estimations, even though
standard errors may be too small.
The result of this discussion is that even if it is not possible to distinguish
every failure losses, it is possible to establish a threshold u above which
every loss due to the lack of liquidity should be accounted for. Given the risk
neutrality assumption, the only information needed for optimization purposes





if it has a ﬁnite value, what occurs for ξ < 1.
It is important to point out that the use of (56) requires the assumption
that the distribution of failure losses is stationary. The rationale of this
assumption is that, once all liquid assets have been used, the distribution of
losses does not depend anymore on how the resources have been allocated in
the short-run, because only illiquid assets remain. If there is some dependence
it would be on the type of illiquid assets, on bank’s business practices, on
bank’s reputation, or on some other factor that is exogenous to the model and
could remain constant or change slowly throughout the estimation period,
and in this case, rare, but extreme eﬀects related to bank fragility could
dominate the result of the mathematical expectation.
Without enough historical data it is not possible to estimate the expected
loss, let alone to test the stationarity hypothesis. Thus, the usual assumption
that E(e Lf) is a function of the asset allocation is also discussed in this work,
allowing for the estimation of E(e Lf) with available data. In the empirical
section of this work, I describe the methodology that was used to apply the
model with real data, and the expected loss is assumed to be the mathemat-
ical expectation of the cash demands in excess of the availability of liquid
resources, conditional to the occurrence of a failure. In general, this approach
assumes a linear relation between the conditional expectations of the failure
loss and the cash demand in excess to available liquid resources, given a fail-
ure. The argument, in this case, is that more value destroying actions would
take place when the lack of liquid resources is more severe. The coeﬃcient
of the linear relation is the punitive cost of the value destroying sources of
cash.
2.4 The Economic Proﬁt
Due to banks’ particularities, the opportunity cost of investments should be
given in terms of the acceptable return on the economic capital required
24by operations (Schroeck, 2002, chap. 6). Thus, the expected return to be
estimated is the return to equity holders. This implies that the cost of funding
through debt, reﬂected in transfer prices, must be deducted together with
operational expenses. As a result, the expected returns on liquid and illiquid
























I are the expected revenues per monetary unit invested




I are costs and operational expenses per monetary unit




I are the expected losses per monetary unit invested in the
portfolios of liquid and illiquid assets, respectively, in the i-th period;
• TP i represents the transfer price of resources in the i-th period.
In the case of liquid assets, as market prices are available, it is possible
to use these prices to estimate returns, which should already reﬂect expected
















Regarding illiquid assets, mainly loans, the biggest challenge is not to
estimate revenues, but expected losses. This can be done with the use of
historical values of losses on credit contracts or through more sophisticated
credit risk models.
Moreover, the opportunity cost must reﬂect the economic capital required
by the investment. Thus, in the case of banks, the economic proﬁt will
be given by how much the investment return to shareholders exceeds the
required return on the economic capital needed to make the investment:
13Such costs and expenses refers only to incremental values in δt, since ﬁxed and pre-
dictable costs have already been excluded from the amount of resources available to allo-
cation.
25E(e Π) = wLAL,DE(e rL) − ROE × K(wLAL,D,fe rL)+
+wIAL,DE(e rI) − ROE × K(wIAL,D,fe rI),
(60)
where ROE represents the required return on equity. K(wLAL,D,fe rL) and
K(wIAL,D,fe rI) represent the economic capital required to invest in liquid
and illiquid assets, respectively, as a function of the invested amounts and
the return distributions fe rL and fe rI. So, by (1):













where the limit was used only to make treatable the cases in which wL or wI
are zero.
If it is assumed that the distribution of returns does not change with the
volume invested, what in practice means that the bank will not change its
investment proﬁle, neither in liquid nor in illiquid assets, then the required
economic capital will grow linearly with the volume invested. This will be
true for any methodology to assess the economic capital requirement that
uses a coherent risk measure (Artzner et al., 1999), or even measures that
are not coherent, but shows the positive homogeneity property, as the Value
at Risk, (VaR). In this conditions, the relations above become:

















Equations (63) and (64) simply establish that the opportunity cost will
be given by the required return on equity, weighted by the leverage of invest-
ments, that is, by the proportion of equity that will be used.
The discussion about the details of the implementation of economic cap-
ital models is beyond the scope of the work. Many banks have already their
own models and there are excellent texts that provide broad coverage of
the theoretical and practical aspects involved, such as Crouhy et al. (2001,
chap. 14), Schroeck (2002, chap. 5) and Bessis (2002, sections 15 and 16).
Nonetheless, there are some important aspects related to risk aggregation
that should be considered.
26As discussed in Saunders (1999), the RAROC "has been historically cal-
culated on individual basis, despising correlations", but such correlations
may exist and the economic capital would not be, necessarily, simply the
weighted sum of K(AL,D,fe rL) and K(AL,D,fe rI). In general, the RAROC
would be a function of the allocation between liquid and illiquid assets. If
only the correlations between the new portfolios of liquid and illiquid assets
are taken into account, after the investment Ai
L,D we should have:












− ROE × K(AL,D,fwLe rL+wIe rI). (66)
According to Artzner et al. (1999), in the case of coherent risk
measures, or at least sub-additive risk measures, K(AL,D,fwLe rL+wIe rI) ≤
wLK(AL,D,fe rL) + wIK(AL,D,fe rI).
That said, I assume that the risk measure used to assess the economic
capital can correctly incorporate correlations (see Saita, 2004). Though, in
order to simplify the exposition of more fundamental aspects of the optimiza-
tion, which will be discussed in the next section, I will use the capital costs
as in (63) and (64).
In the case of the ROE, even though it can be estimated by the average of
historical results on shareholders equity, accounting measures are more prone
to manipulations and distortions. One alternative is to use pricing models,
as the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM. Damodaran (2002, chap. 21)
suggests that, in the case of banks, there should not be a leverage correction
in the beta of the CAPM, since debt works for the bank as accounts payable
would for a non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm. Table 2.4 shows CAPM betas of Brazilian
banks listed at the São Paulo’s Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de São
Paulo, BOVESPA).
Using the average of these betas weighted by market capitalization of
each stock, the obtained banking sector beta is about 0.9.
Copeland et al. (2000, chap. 10) suggest that a reasonable value for the
market premium risk, the diﬀerence between the average return of a theoret-
ical market portfolio and the risk free rate, is around 5%, based on estimates
that used data from Unites States’ companies. Cysne (2006) compares his
results with four others that used Brazilian data, and shows values that range
from 10% to 29%. Nevertheless, all estimates uses data from a high inﬂation
period, what may distort the results, and because of this, the lower value
of the range will be used. On the other hand, by the second half of 2006,
27Name Type Beta Market Cap. Weighted
(R$ millions) beta
ALFA HOLDING S.A. Preferred 0.16 56.75 0.00004
BCO ALFA DE INVESTIMENTO S.A. Common 0.27 317.76 0.00036
BCO ALFA DE INVESTIMENTO S.A. Preferred 0.31 210.40 0.00027
BCO AMAZONIA S.A. Common 0.63 847.87 0.00221
BCO ESTADO DE SERGIPE S.A. - BANESE Preferred 0.47 158.12 0.00031
BCO ESTADO DE SAO PAULO S.A. - BANESPA Common 0.46 6,238.40 0.01188
BCO ESTADO DE SAO PAULO S.A. - BANESPA Preferred 0.53 6,587.13 0.01446
BCO ESTADO DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL S.A. Preferred 0.42 1,271.33 0.00221
BCO BRADESCO S.A. Common 1.09 35,420.78 0.15988
BCO BRADESCO S.A. Preferred 1.05 37,478.04 0.16295
BCO BRASIL S.A. Common 0.95 42.214,91 0.16607
BCO ITAU HOLDING FINANCEIRA S.A. Common 0.77 36,478.97 0.11631
BCO ITAU HOLDING FINANCEIRA S.A. Preferred 1.01 42,935.26 0.17957
BCO SUDAMENRIS BRASIL S.A. Common 0.69 3,037.20 0.00868
UNIBANCO UNIAO DE BCOS BRASILEIROS S.A. Common 0.64 18,891.45 0.05007
UNIBANCO UNIAO DE BCOS BRASILEIROS S.A. Preferred 0.82 9,347.33 0.03174
TOTAL 241,491.71 0.90700
Source: Bloomberg, 10/30/2006.
Table 1: Brazilian bank’s betas with respect to São Paulo’s Stock Exchange
Index, IBOVESPA.
Brazilian government securities were paying interests of about 13.5% a year.
The CAPM will predict, therefore, a ROE of 22.5% a year.
2.5 Optimization
The assumption of RAROC and EVA models is that shareholders will seek
the highest expected economic proﬁt E(e Π) and any positive economic proﬁt
will enhance the shareholders value. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, it
is necessary to account for the possibility of the failure loss e Li
f. Thus, while
deciding the best allocation between liquid and illiquid assets, a risk neutral
agent should maximize the expected economic proﬁt, given the possibility of
loss due to the lack of liquidity: (1−P i
f)×E(e Πi)+P i




f). The complete problem, given the restrictions discussed in

























From restriction (ii) in (67), it is possible to write wI = 1 − wL, and the
28problem can be treated as the optimization of a function of one real variable,
with the domain in an closed interval. This interval is given by restrictions



















































If (56) is used, and E(e Li



































but in either case, P i
f = P i
f(wi) = P i
f(wi
L).
If the failure probability has been estimated through simulation, it is only
necessary to ﬁnd the greatest value of (69) or (70) to the simulated values of
wi
L in the interval (68).
Though, as neither data nor parameters to a simulation are widely avail-
able outside the ﬁnancial institution, it will be useful to use expression (52)
in order to quantitatively assess the results of the model. While it is very
simple to numerically obtain the proposed optimization, the fact that µi
C and
specially σi
C are functions of wi
L makes the derivatives of P i
f(wi
L) too big and
clumsy to allow an algebraic analysis from which one could get any intuition
of the optimization process. On the other hand, the result of a change in wi
L
on µi
C has a secondary eﬀect on the availability of resources, when compared














29and, therefore, a small change ∆wi
L in wi
L results in a change in the cash

























As δt is ideally small, and (µi
C,I − µi
L) is most likely a number smaller
than one,14 then (µC,I − µi
L)∆wi
LAi
L,Dδt is much smaller than the change in
the investment in liquid assets given by ∆wi
LAi
L,D. For example, even if δt
represents a month, i.e. δt = 1
12, and (µC,I − µi
L) = 25%, then the change in
the cash generated in the period δt due to a change in wi
L is 48 times smaller
than the change in the investment in liquid assets given by ∆wi
LAi
L,D. A
similar analysis may be done to σi
C, in such a way that in the following
discussion it is assumed that δt and (µi
C,I −µi
L) are small enough so that µi
C
and σi
C may be treated as constants with respect to wi
L.
By the theorem of Weierstrass, if an objective function is continuous in a
compact interval, then the function has a maximum and a minimum in this
interval. The failure probability as deﬁned in (52) is a continuous function
of wi
L, and the interval (68) is a compact set, such that there is a maximum
and a minimum.
The cumulative probability function of the normal distribution is twice
diﬀerentiable, such that the optimal choice will be either a corner solution,
given by one of the extremes in the interval (68), or a value that causes the
derivative of (70) to equal zero and the second derivative to be negative,

































L)2 > 0. (74)
In order to exist an interior solution, it is necessary, even though not
suﬃcient, that both conditions are satisﬁed. With the objective to make the
14The diﬀerence between median values of µi
C,I and of µi
L found in the empirical section
is 25%.









La − b) + (1 − e
−λδt)Φ(−w
i





































































where φ(x) is the standard normal distribution probability density function
and φ0(x) is its ﬁrst derivative.





















L that satisﬁes (68). If there is a solution, equation (81) may be
trivially solved through numerical methods. If there is not a solution, the
maximum will occur at one of the interval extremes.
The right hand side of the equation is clearly limited below by zero,
since it results from the sum of products of functions whose images in the
real domain are always positive. As it is assumed that ξi < 1 so that the
expected value of the distribution of losses is ﬁnite, there can only be a
solution for equation (81) if the expected return in excess to the opportunity
cost is bigger for the illiquid assets. Moreover, the higher possible value
for the expression is φ(0) = 1/
√
2π. This is an intuitive result and would
31remain the same if φ(x) was any symmetric function, diﬀerentiable in every
point, with a global maximum at zero and monotonic to the left and to the
right of its maximum. Anyway, this statement can be very easily veriﬁed
through calculus by simply equating the partial derivatives of the function
f(x,y,z) = zφ(x)+(1−z)φ(x+y) to zero. The resulting system of equations
has a solution for x = y = 0, regardless of the value of z, such that the
function has a maximum value of f(0,0,z) = zφ(0) + (1 − z)φ(0) = φ(0) in
any point of the line (0,0,z) ∈ R3.






































which is easier to be interpreted: there will be no interior solution if there
is a large advantage in investing in illiquid assets or if the expected loss
is too small when related to the volatility in cash generation and funding
availability.
Regarding the number of critical points, if c is a positive value then the
right hand side of equation (81) is monotonically decreasing with respect to
the rises in the proportion of liquid assets and there could only be a single
critical point. If Ji is large enough so that c is negative, then, starting from
wi
L = 0, there will be at least one non-empty interval in which −wi
La−c > 0
and φ(−wi
La − c) will grow with wi
L. If, in addition, the parameters λ and
δt are large enough so that 1 − e−λδt has a value of the same magnitude of
e−λδt, allowing that the eﬀect of an increase in (1 − e−λδt)φ(−wi
La − c) be
signiﬁcant with respect to a decrease in e−λδtφ(−wi
La − b), then there could







which is equal to e−λδtφ(−wi
La − b) + (1 − e−λδt)φ(−wi
La − c).








L ≤ 1, 0.0004 ≤ λδt ≤ 0.42, or 0.0004 ≤ λδt ≤ 2 to make the
visualization easier. The parameters b and specially c were altered so that it
is possible to realize their inﬂuence in the shape of the surface.






is monotonically decreasing for any λδt. In the remaining ﬁgures, with c < 0,




































































































































Figure 2: Behavior of e−λδtφ(−wi
La − b) + (1 − e−λδt)φ(−wi
La − c) given
0 ≤ wi
L ≤ 1, 0.0004 ≤ λδt ≤ 0.42 or 0.0004 ≤ λδt ≤ 2, a = 6, and several
values for the parameters b and c.







grows before it starts to decrease. For very small values













La − b) + (1 − e
λδt)φ0(−w
i
La − c) > 0, (84)
given a > 0.15
It is known that φ0(x) > 0 for every negative value of x, and one can
assume that b > 0, otherwise the average cash generation and the funding
opportunities would be null or negative. Moreover, the chances are that the
probability of no jumps, e−λδt, is bigger than the probability of at least one
jump, 1 − e−λδt. For example, with λ = 4.8 and δt = 1
12 the probability
of no jumps is at least twice as big as the probability of the occurrence of
jumps, and this proportion scales up to around 2,500 to 1 when λ = 0.1 and
δt = 1
252. As a result, the inequality (84) would only be violated if Ji is large
enough so that the value of c is suﬃciently negative. Nevertheless, φ0(x) has
a minimum for x > 0, or a maximum in absolute values, after which the value
of φ0(x) starts to grow again, or diminish in absolute values, towards zero as
x tends to inﬁnity. This way, φ0(−wi
La − c) can only be suﬃciently negative
in a limited range of positive values of −wi
La−c, depending on the values of
λ and δt, so that (1 − e−λδt)φ0(−wi
La − c) can be larger, in absolute values,
than e−λδtφ0(−wi
La − b). For suﬃciently small values of λ and δt, e−λδt will
be much bigger than 1 − e−λδt and the inequality cannot be violated.
Figure 3 shows three situations that could typically occur16 when c < 0,
since if c > 0 there is a single critical point, which corresponds to the value
of wi
L that maximizes the objective function. This ﬁgure corresponds to
ﬁgure 2v where three transversal sections are analyzed. The intersection
between these sections and the surface is highlighted and is the graphic of
e−λδtφ(−wi
La − b) + (1 − e−λδt)φ(−wi
La − c) given a value of λδt, with wi
L








L] − [E(e ri
I) − Ri
I]}, which
should be equal to e−λδtφ(−wi
La−b)+(1−e−λδt)φ(−wi
La−c) so that there
is a critical point, according to 81, is represented by the horizontal lines
also highlighted in each of the transversal section. The critical points cor-
respond to the intersections between the horizontal lines and the graphic of
15If a is negative or zero, then the bank is already in a liquidity crises or there are not
available resources for allocation.
16There are two other possibilities that involve the existence of saddle points: one saddle
point as the only critical point, or a local maximum and a saddle point.
34Figure 3: Typical situations for the maximization problem when c < 0, where
there is a local maximum (point A), two maxima and one minimum (maxima
at B and D, and minimum at C), or a maximum (point F), and a minimum
(point E).
e−λδtφ(−wi
La − b) + (1 − e−λδt)φ(−wi
La − c), and if the slope of this graphic
with respect to changes in wi


















La − c) > 0
and that critical point is, by 84, a local maximum. On the other hand, if
the slope of the graphic is positive with respect to changes in wi
L, then the
intersection corresponds to a local minimum.
At point A λδt is too small for (1 − e−λδt)φ0(−wi
La − c) to have any
signiﬁcant inﬂuence, and there is only one critical point. The slope of the
curve at this point is negative and, therefore, it is a local maximum, which,
in this case, is also the maximum in all the interval 0 ≤ wi
L ≤ 1. Points
B, C and D represent a situation where there can be three critical points:
two local maxima at points B and D (one of them will be the maximum in
the whole interval), since the curve shows negative slope at these points, and
one local minimum at C. Finally, points E and F represent a situation where
there is one local minimum (point E) and one maximum (point F).
Corner solutions mean that at the present volume of resources, Ai
L,D, it
is not possible to reach the optimal liquidity level in a single period, and
35the model have to be applied dynamically throughout the time. This occurs
either because the cash generation plus liquid strategic positions are already
enough to cover for liquidity losses, in the case where wi
L = 0 is the solution,
or because it is necessary to raise the liquidity and to lower the inventory of
illiquid assets17, in the case where wi
L = 1 is the solution.
3 Empirical Test of the Model
This section describes an empirical test of the model that uses Brazilian banks
data available to the Banco Central do Brasil (Central Bank of Brazil), BCB.
This means that the information used is more detailed than public informa-
tion, but it is not as complete as managerial information, so that it will be
necessary to make some assumptions to provide estimates of unobservable
values. As it is not an eﬀective implementation of the model, but a general
assessment of its viability, the lack of precision is not a problem. Addition-
ally, as part of the information used is protected by law, all data is presented
in aggregate form and without identiﬁcation.
There is, though, an important problem: the lack of data about the
failure losses. As in the case of operational risks, this kind of information
is not easily available, and speciﬁc initiatives need to be taken so that the
data starts to be collected. Thus, the results presented here are conditional
to arbitrary loss values, assumed to be reasonable choices.
Whenever accounting data is used, the Brazilian standard COSIF code18
for the accounts used will be cited for reference.
3.1 Methodology
In order to calibrate the model and solve the maximization problem, it is
necessary to obtain the following parameters:
a. Total cash generating assets: Ai
C;
b. Amount of liquid resources available to discretionary allocation: Ai
L,D;
17This may be accomplished simply by not making new investments and letting the
current assets to mature, or by engaging loan sales or securitization. The best course
of action depends on how low is the liquidity, and on strategic issues, for example, the
preservation of market share.
18COSIF stands for Plano Contábil das Instituições do Sistema Financeiro Nacional, or
Accounting Plan for the Institutions of the National Financial System. It is a standardized
accounting plan for ﬁnancial institutions established in Brazil through the Circular 1.272
of the Central Bank of Brazil in December 29th, 1987.
36c. Mean continuous cash yield on Ai
C: µi
C;
d. Standard deviation of the cash yield on Ai
C in annualized continuous
rates: σi
C;
e. Drift component of the funding opportunities distribution: µi
F;
f. Diﬀusion component of the funding opportunities distribution: σi
F;
g. Jump component of the funding opportunities distribution: Ji;
h. Poisson process intensity: λ;
i. Expected value of the loss due to the lack of liquidity: E(e Li
f);
j. Expected return of the investments in liquid assets:E(e ri
L);
k. Expected return of the investments in illiquid assets: E(e ri
I);
l. Opportunity cost of equity: ROE;
m. Required capital to invest in liquid assets: K(Ai
L,D,fe rL);
n. Required capital to invest in illiquid assets: K(Ai
L,D,fe rI).
The available information is:
• On a daily basis: data about the deposits and total interbank credit
operations from September 30, 2004, to September 29, 2006;
• On a monthly basis: accounting information about ﬁnancial institu-
tions from July 2003 to June 2006.
As most of the available information is on monthly basis, it will be used
δt = 1/12. The total volume of loans plus the total volume of securities
and derivative operations was used as the information in (a). Operations
with securities and derivatives will be generically called treasury operations,
henceforth. The COSIF account 3.1.0.00.00-0 was used for the value of credit
operations. Accounts 1.3.0.00.00-4 and 4.7.0.00.00-1 where used for the value
of treasury operations.
In order to obtain item (b), it was used the average variation on the
inventory of credit and treasury operations. As the treasury operations are
marked to market, part of the variation does not come from new investment,
but from capital gains of existing assets, and in this case, the total invested
amount is overestimated. On the other hand, debt payments by bank’s clients
37decrease the loan portfolio, and in this case, the variation underestimates the
invested amount, and both eﬀects help to reduce the ﬁnal distortion.
As there is not available information about the exact structure of liquid
and illiquid assets, the credit portfolio was used as a proxy of the cash gen-
erating illiquid assets, and treasury operations were used as proxy of cash
generating liquid assets in order to estimate items (c) and (d). Equation (8)
and information about revenues from credit operations in COSIF accounts
7.1.1.00.00-1, 7.1.2.00.00-4, 7.1.3.00.00-7 and 7.1.4.00.00-019 were used to es-
timate the cash yields from illiquid assets. It is not possible to use (10) for
treasury operations without information that allows to tell price changes from
new investments. Though, as treasury operations are marked to market, it
was used the ratio between the proﬁt of treasury operations and the total
amount of treasury operations as the cash yield from treasury operations.




L,I, allowing for the obtention of estimates of µi
C and σi
C
for any portfolio of credit and treasury operations.
The parameters corresponding to items (e) to (h) were estimated from the
data on daily basis, according to the methodology consolidated in equations
(37) to (48). δ e F i
S corresponds to the change on deposits and on net interbank
credit operations.
The greatest challenge to the practical implementation of the model is the
absence of historical data about losses stemming from the lack of liquidity.
In section 2.3 I discuss an Extreme Value Theory approach to the estimation
of the loss given a failure, but as the data required to proceed the estimation
is not available, I will follow, in this empirical test, the more traditional ap-
proach of assuming that the loss given a failure and the amount by which the
liquidity constraint is violated are proportional, where the proportionality co-
eﬃcient represents a punitive funding cost. For now, I will assume an unitary
coeﬃcient for the punitive funding cost, which, a priori, is as arbitrary as any
other choice. Later on, this assumption will be replaced by another estimate
based on the ﬁndings of the empirical tests. Thus, according to the liquidity
restrictions in (49), this means that the value of the expected loss given a
failure will be proportional to the mathematical expectation of by how much
δ e Ai
C + δ e F i
S,NJ or δ e Ai
C + δ e F i
S,J will result less than −wi
LAi
L,D, conditional to
the violation of the liquidity restriction:
19Revenues, started by digit 7, and expenses, started by digit 8, are accumulated monthly
and transferred to shareholders’ equity every semester so that, except for January and July,
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where rP is the punitive funding cost. As discussed above, rP will be assumed
to be one for the moment.
The mean excess function of a random variable e X is deﬁned as:20
e e X(u) = E( e X − u | e X > u). (86)
In the case of normal random variables with mean µ and standard devi-
ation σ, the mean excess function is known and given by:21









The expectations in (85) correspond to mean excess functions, but ap-
plied to the left tail, in such a way that, by the asymmetry of the normal



































f) is a function of wi
L, the optimization was done numerically.
This result is only a conjecture, assumed to be a reasonable one, that is
used to allow for the test of the model with available information. A test
of how both representations of E(e Li
f) shown in this work ﬁts to data would
only be possible with the availability of historical data of losses caused by
the lack of liquidity.
20See, for example, Embrechts et al. (1997).
21In order to obtain the mean excess function for a particular distribution one should
remember that E( e X − u | e X > u) =
R ∞
u (x − u)f e X(x)dx/
R ∞
u f e X(x)dx. In the case of
a normal distribution, result (87) follows rather straightforwardly from the substitution
z = (x − µ)/σ ⇒ dz = dx/σ.




−∞ f e X(x)dx it
is possible to obtain an equivalent expression without the use of the mean excess function.
The mean excess function representation was chosen because it is more condensed.
39The historical average returns on treasury and credit portfolios, net of
funding costs, were used to estimate the expected returns on liquid and illiq-
uid assets, respectively. Marginal operational expenses were assumed to be
zero. In the case of the treasury portfolio, the proﬁts and losses used were
in COSIF accounts 7.1.5.00.00-3 and 8.1.5.00.00-0, and each return was cal-
culated as the proﬁts and losses over the total treasury portfolio, net of the
monthly accumulated CDI rate, which was used as a transfer price. CDI
stands for Certiﬁcado de Depósito Interbancário, or Certiﬁcate of Interbank
Deposit, and the CDI rate is an average of interest rates on unsecured inter-
bank short term funding, but its value is usually very close to the rates of
repurchase agreements of securities issued by the federal government.
With respect to the credit portfolio, proﬁts and losses were estimated as
the revenues from several types of credit operations less the corresponding
expenses, which include funding costs by COSIF accounting standards. Rev-
enues were obtained from accounts 7.1.1.00.00-1, 7.1.2.00.00-4, 7.1.3.00.00-7,
and 7.1.4.00.00-0, and expenses from accounts 8.1.1.00.00-8, 8.1.2.00.00-1,
8.1.3.00.00-4, and 8.1.4.00.00-7.
The value suggested in section 2.4 was used as the opportunity cost of eq-
uity, ROE, item (l). The initial value of 22.5% a year was adjusted, though,
to include the mean proportion of taxes and proﬁt-sharing, which were not de-
ducted from the returns above described. The proportion of taxes and proﬁt-
sharing was obtained from the monthly values of taxes plus proﬁt-sharing,
registered on accounts 8.9.00.00-9 and 8.9.7.00.00-8 respectively, over the ﬁnal
result of the period, given by the diﬀerence between total revenues, COSIF
account 7.0.0.00.00-9, and total expenses, COSIF account 8.0.0.00.00-6. The
value used to estimate de adjusted ROE was the median of the proportions
from July 2003 and June 2006. The median was used instead of the mean
because in some cases there were extreme variations so that the proportion
became greater than 1, what is obviously unsustainable through time. The
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The accounting historical ROE was also estimated for comparison. It was
obtained from the division of the ﬁnal result of the period by the shareholer’s
equity, COSIF account 6.0.0.00.00-2.
The economic capital required by the investment in liquid assets, item
(m), was obtained from a simpliﬁed version of parametric VaR, which were
40estimated from the mean and standard deviation of returns on treasury op-

















In the case of the economic capital required by the investment in illiq-
uid assets, item (n), as the portfolio is not marked to market, it would be
necessary to use more sophisticated methodologies such as RiskMetricsTM
or CreditRisk+.24 There are not, though, available information to apply
these models. Additionally, as there are only 36 months in the data base
and a much smaller number of sample points representing losses, the estima-
tion of an adequate percentile or even the parametrization of the credit loss
distribution is hindered. Given such restrictions, it was chosen the simpler
path of using the legal requirement of 11% of the APR (Ativo Ponderado ao
Risco, or Risk Weighted Assets, which is the Brazilian implementation of the
Basel Accord’s credit risk-adjusted assets). The proportion of 11%, greater
than the original Basel Accord’s minimum requirement of 8%, was deﬁned
by the Resolução 2.606, issued May 27th, 1999, by the CMN (Conselho Mon-
etário Nacional, or National Monetary Council). The deﬁnition of APR was
introduced by the Circular 2.099, issued August 17th, 1994, by the BCB
(Banco Central do Brasil, Central Bank of Brazil), eﬀectively implementing
the Brazilian version of the ﬁrst Basel Accord. The weights applied to the
various assets in the composition of the APR have changed through time,




L,D,fe rI) = 0.11 × A
i
L,D. (91)
Even though the use of a constant factor ignores the quality of credit
portfolios, one of the problems that lead to the proposal of a new capital
accord, it is a de facto requirement until the implementation of Basel II.
23The economic proﬁt model that is optimized already uses returns that have δt peri-
odicity.
24The reference documentation for RiskMetrics and CreditRisk+ models are Gupton
et al. (1997) and CSFB (1997), respectively. There is a brief description of both in Saunders
and Cornett (2006, chap. 11) and Saunders (1999, chap. 4 and 7).
25Most notable exceptions are habitational loans, with 50% weighting, (Circular 2.568,
issued May 4th, 1995) and tax credits, with 300% weighting (Circular 2.916, issued August
6th, 1999). The accounts with the needed details to make a precise assessment of the APR
(1.6.4.30.00-4 and 1.6.4.60.30-4 for habitational loans and 1.8.8.25.00-2 for tax credits), are
protected by law, and it was chosen to use public information whenever possible.
41Finally, it is important to note that, with exception of items (e) to (h),
for which the daily data base was used, every other items were estimated
with public information.
3.2 Results
The monthly database contains accounting information organized as de-
scribed by the Top 50 methodology of the BCB26. The used information cor-
responds to all Brazilian depositary ﬁnancial institutions, and the accounting
data is consolidated, when it is the case, by ﬁnancial conglomerates. This
subset of the available accounting information is called "Banking - Consol-
idated I" in the Top 50 methodology. All estimates were done using data
from July 2003 to June 2006.
From the initial 257 conglomerates and ﬁnancial institutions, 82 without
credit or treasury operations were ﬁltered, and 127 more, which presented
negative historical average return on either portfolio, were also excluded.
Table 2 presents a summary of the estimated values after the exclusion of
institutions without credit or treasury portfolios.
Estimate of Average Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation
AC(×106) 10,341.79 1,299.74 184,778.84 5.15 27,045.74
AL,D(×106) 106.87 7.54 1,219.92 -65.79 258.64
µC,I 0.860262 0.459656 9.076639 0.114010 1.202106
σC,I 0.170609 0.038728 2.102526 0.002812 0.383777
µL 0.108560 0.151802 0.700159 -2.414947 0.245505
σL 0.091945 0.049350 1.806865 0.006345 0.190377
σL,I 0.000018 0.000011 0.028413 -0.036656 0.005963
wC,I 0.581105 0.621699 0.998942 0.001160 0.281870
wC,L 0.418895 0.378301 0.998840 0.001058 0.281870
µC 0.381063 0.336335 2.001438 -0.016119 0.242569
σC 0.062352 0.030106 1.236773 0.004200 0.135129
E(e rI) 0.011478 0.008840 1.459131 -0.454512 0.159028
σ(e rI) 0.068652 0.009200 1.474703 0.000755 0.196751
E(e rL) -0.003012 -0.001062 0.093066 -0.113950 0.016213
σ(e rL) 0.026927 0.014502 0.521380 0.000609 0.060595
ROA∗ 0.001490 0.001163 0.019791 -0.004143 0.002779
ROE∗ 0.007867 0.007687 0.047363 -0.032361 0.011791
ROE 0.027097 0.027018 0.061080 0.014540 0.008150
* Historical accounting average of the monthly return on assets (ROA) and on
shareholder’s equity (ROE).
Table 2: Parameters estimates for depositary institutions with non zero value
of credit and treasury operations.
The estimate of parameters after excluding the cases where historical
negative average returns occurred is presented in table 3.
26A complete description of the methodology is available at http://www.bcb.gov.br/
Fis/Top50/Port/default-i.asp?idioma=I&id=50top.
42Estimate of Average Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation
AC(×106) 14,360.72 311.41 105,090.17 20.52 28,575.46
AL.D(×106) 157.70 2.78 1,191.94 -40.45 310.91
µC,I 0.688399 0.460295 9.076639 0.153307 1.255961
σC,I 0.083614 0.030826 1.867301 0.004902 0.266705
µL 0.199823 0.187244 0.394792 0.136192 0.043624
σL 0.059932 0.046709 0.447019 0.007408 0.072994
σL,I -0.000199 0.000023 0.001717 -0.012600 0.001904
wC,I 0.711730 0.697291 0.997429 0.035632 0.200094
wC,L 0.288270 0.302709 0.964368 0.002571 0.200094
µC 0.419358 0.388919 0.743883 0.161078 0.146941
σC 0.036183 0.027623 0.107942 0.004200 0.030456
E(e rI) 0.052345 0.015188 1.459131 0.000466 0.208284
σ(e rI) 0.041090 0.005015 1.474703 0.000755 0.211747
E(e rL) 0.003280 0.002150 0.019973 0.000016 0.003903
σ(e rL) 0.017572 0.013357 0.133008 0.000616 0.021646
ROA∗ 0.002039 0.001541 0.010060 -0.004078 0.002580
ROE∗ 0.009916 0.008295 0.047363 -0.015611 0.010429
ROE 0.027063 0.028182 0.047146 0.014540 0.007372
K(AL,D,fe rI/AL,D) 0.110000 0.110000 0.110000 0.110000 0.000000
K(AL,D,fe rL/AL,D) 0.051018 0.037273 0.405203 0.001635 0.064976
RI 0.002977 0.003100 0.005186 0.001599 0.000811
RL 0.001347 0.000900 0.013525 0.000064 0.001985
* Historical accounting average of the monthly return on assets (ROA) and on
shareholder’s equity (ROE).
Table 3: Parameters estimates for depositary institutions with non zero value
of credit and treasury operations and positive average historical returns.
In 12 of the 48 cases summarized in table 3, the estimate of AL,D resulted
in a negative value. The average proportion between the estimates of AL,D
and AC in the cases where AL,D ≥ 0 is 1.17%, and this proportion was used
to estimate positive values for AL,D when AL,D < 0.
The information from the "Banking - Consolidated I" of the Top 50
methodology are consolidated for institutions that are in the same conglom-
erate, but information of individual institutions are also available. Therefore,
the last ﬁlter has excluded the institutions that have been listed individually,
but at June 2006 were part of a ﬁnancial conglomerate, in order to avoid dou-
ble counting, resulting in a sample of 28 institutions or conglomerates. The
estimates of µf, σF, λ and J were done for these 28 institutions and 3 more
were removed, two of them because they presented zero value of deposits and
one more because a negative estimate of σ2
F. By equation (47), this occurs
if b σ2(δ e FS) < ( b J)2 × b λδt, in what case the model (30) obviously does not ﬁt
the data. Figure 4 shows the behavior of deposits plus net interbank credit
operations (active less passive operations) of the institution.
Only two other institutions showed a pattern of deposits plus net inter-
bank credit operations that resembles the one in ﬁgure 4, but they did not
generated negative estimates of σ2
F. Table 4 shows the summary of estimates
of all parameters for the ﬁnal set of 25 ﬁnancial institutions and conglomer-
43Figure 4: Daily behavior of deposits plus net interbank credit operations
from the institution with negative estimate of σ2
F.
ates.
For 12 from the 25 institutions and conglomerates, the estimated value
of J was negative, indicating positive jumps and not sudden drops on the
amount of funding opportunities. In these cases, and even in other cases
where the estimate of J was positive, there were not drastic reductions on the
funding opportunities, what leads to downward biased estimates of the jump,
a common problem while estimating rare events. Nevertheless, the purpose
of the test is to show that the proposed model may have an important eﬀect
on value creation, thus, given that a higher value of J only raises the failure
probability, if even with downward biased estimates the use of the model
still leads to signs of value creation, then its importance tends to increase
with better estimates of J. In order to illustrate these eﬀects, ﬁgure 5 shows
some patterns of deposits plus net interbank credit operations for institutions
whose estimates of J were negative, and ﬁgure 6 shows some cases where J
estimates were positive.
44Estimate of Average Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation
AC(×106) 16,062.53 292.47 105,090.17 21.21 31,005.96
AL.D(×106) 175.43 2.76 902.17 -19.92 323.83
µC,I 0.473655 0.441006 1.174521 0.208630 0.198558
σC,I 0.038726 0.024972 0.169484 0.004902 0.043225
µL 0.199783 0.187300 0.394792 0.168443 0.045790
σL 0.044745 0.032678 0.122689 0.007444 0.031575
σL,I -0.000040 -0.000008 0.001361 -0.001262 0.000437
wC,I 0.735366 0.722447 0.997429 0.285185 0.174000
wC,L 0.264634 0.277553 0.714815 0.002571 0.174000
µC 0.389769 0.381001 0.648272 0.194777 0.118437
σC 0.029496 0.023820 0.107942 0.004200 0.027593
E(e rI) 0.019043 0.013219 0.083480 0.000667 0.017953
σ(e rI) 0.009426 0.003986 0.054114 0.000755 0.013111
E(e rL) 0.003040 0.002069 0.019973 0.000322 0.003995
σ(e rL) 0.013241 0.009733 0.039723 0.000838 0.010244
ROA∗ 0.001890 0.001558 0.009468 -0.000733 0.002064
ROE∗ 0.010039 0.007530 0.047363 -0.001883 0.009400
ROE 0.028102 0.028951 0.037423 0.017056 0.006512
K(AL,D,fe rI/AL,D) 0.110000 0.110000 0.110000 0.110000 0.000000
K(AL,D,fe rL/AL,D) 0.037874 0.027850 0.117140 0.002266 0.029587
RI 0.003091 0.003185 0.004117 0.001876 0.000716
RL 0.001048 0.000872 0.003182 0.000064 0.000810
E(e rI) − RI 0.015951 0.010122 0.079921 -0.002613 0.018031
E(e rL) − RL 0.001992 0.000695 0.017397 -0.001113 0.003604
µF(×106) 1,334.89 28.13 7,704.08 -1,125.74 2,682.64
σF(×106) 1,416.79 52.89 7,803.93 6.47 2,568.75
λ 1.770721 0.020517 37.936676 0.000002 7.554380
J(×106) 1,465.18 7.36 48,772.95 -31,983.82 13,027.97
* Historical accounting average of the monthly return on assets (ROA) and on
shareholder’s equity (ROE).
Table 4: Estimates of all parameters for the ﬁnal set of 25 ﬁnancial institu-
tions and conglomerates.
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Figure 5: Daily behavior of deposits plus net interbank credit operations for
institutions and conglomerates whose estimates of J were negative.
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Figure 6: Daily behavior of deposits plus net interbank credit operations for
institutions and conglomerates whose estimates of J were positive.
47The diﬀerence between the expected economic proﬁt and the expected
failure loss was optimized with the estimated parameters. The results are
summarized in table 5.
Result of Average Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation
E(e LF)/AC 0.054154 0.019235 0.472060 0.004454 0.099808
Pf 0.212895 0.117691 0.986309 0.001605 0.223849
E(e Π)/SE 0.000366 0.000053 0.003513 -0.000031 0.000926
[E(e Π) − PfE(e Lf)]/SE -0.092487 -0.008128 0.002569 -1.121093 0.242609
PfE(e Lf)/SE 0.096506 0.005918 1.121101 0.000029 0.247831
PfE(e Lf)/E(e Π) 6,216.33 28.11 149,631.25 -24,004.14 32,647.69
SE = Shareholder’s equity.
Table 5: Summary of the optimization results, given the possibility of loss
due to the lack of liquidity.
There were ﬁve interior solutions, but three of them were very close to
the extreme, with wL ≈ 1. The two other interior solutions occurred for
wL ≈ 0.2 and wL ≈ 0.9. The corner solutions comprehended ﬁfteen solutions
with wL = 1 and only one solution wL = 0. In three cases the value of Φ(x)
was too close to 1, and it was not possible to proceed the optimization due
to the near singular value of the mean excess function argument.
The optimization was repeated without considering the risk of losses due
to the lack of liquidity, that is, only the economic proﬁt was optimized. The
results are in table 6.
Result of Average Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation
E(e LF)/AC 0.056773 0.021699 0.482926 0.005647 0.101611
Pf 0.243920 0.179412 0.988160 0.000532 0.223953
E(e Π)/SE 0.000690 0.000349 0.004321 0.000038 0.001002
[E(e Π) − PfE(e Lf)]/SE -0.099340 -0.015155 0.001061 -1.148484 0.248770
PfE(e Lf)/SE 0.10379796 0.0143496 1.149058842 2.894E-05 0.25420239
PfE(e Lf)/E(e Π) 423.815507 29.400467 3,628.703639 0.100477 879.850675
SE = Shareholder’s equity.
Table 6: Summary of the optimization neglecting the risk of losses due to
the lack of liquidity.
In this case, there were twenty corner solutions with wL = 0 and only two
corner solutions with wL = 1. Again, in three cases there were near singular
values for the arguments of the mean excess function.
There are some important conclusions to be drawn from the results of
the optimizations in tables 5 and 6. Initially, as expected, if the losses from
the lack of liquidity are not considered, the optimization favors the invest-
ment in illiquid assets. When the loss possibility is taken into account, the
reverse scenario occurs. Additionally, at least as modeled here, the failure
48probability values are considerable. The failure probability was, on average,
21.3% when the optimization took into account the possibility of loss due to
the lack of liquidity, and 24.4% when the liquidity restriction was ignored.
The diﬀerence between the medians, least inﬂuenced by extreme values, was
even bigger: the median failure probability considering losses because of the
lack of liquidity was 11.8%, while ignoring liquidity risk it reached 18.0%.
The expected loss also had relevant values, representing, on average, 5.5%
of all inventory of cash generating assets. The combination of both, failure
probability multiplied by the expected loss, has a median value of 0.6% of
shareholder’s equity, and more than the double, approximately 1.4%, when
losses because the lack of liquidity are ignored. Thus, even if E(e Π)/SE is
higher when the optimization does not account for the liquidity restriction,
the eﬀect of the losses because of the lack of liquidity is enough to provide
an excess return on shareholder’s equity of 0.7% a month, or 8.8% a year, on
average, and 8.5% a year when medians are compared.
This result presents some robustness to changes in the parameters. The
optimization was repeated for 20% increases and 20% decreases in all pa-
rameters, except for E(e rL) and σ(e rL) that remained the same so that there
would be some change in the diﬀerence between E(e rI)−RI and E(e rL)−RL.
The results are shown in table 7.
E(e Π)−PfE(e Lf)
SE for optimizations with and without the liquidity restriction
Parameters +20% Original parameters Parameters -20%
Diﬀerence between medians 0.513% (6.3% a year) 0.703% (8.8% a year) 0.601% (7.5% a year)
Diﬀerence between averages 0.694% (8.7% a year) 0.685% (8.5% a year) 0.654% (8.1% a year)
Table 7: Diﬀerence between the values of [E(e Π) − PfE(e Lf)]/SE estimated
by optimizations with and without the liquidity constraint.
The optimizations were repeated with a larger amount of available re-
sources, in order to allow for more interior solutions. By using an AL,D four
times bigger, the number of interior solutions grew from ﬁve to six, with only
one resulting in wL ≈ 1. Additionally, the number of corner solutions with
wL = 0 went from two to three and the number of corner solutions with
wL = 1 felt from ﬁfteen to thirteen. The summary of the results is on table
8.
Comparing the results on table 8 with the ones in the optimization of the
expected economic proﬁt without the liquidity constraint, as summarized on
table 9, it is possible to observe a gain between the medians of the returns
on shareholder’s equity of about 11.1% a year, since the greater availability
of liquid resources to allocation allows for a more pronounced reduction of
the losses because of the lack of liquidity.
49Result of Average Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation
E(e LF)/AC 0.047934 0.015259 0.440059 -0.004371 0.093783
Pf 0.149206 0.075162 0.979191 0.001605 0.211223
E(e Π)/SE 0.001763 0.000213 0.017282 -0.000124 0.004187
[E(e Π) − PfE(e Lf)]/SE -0.070300 -0.002208 0.014023 -1.037530 0.224721
PfE(e Lf)/SE 0.075369 0.002409 1.037560 -0.000050 0.229088
PfE(e Lf)/E(e Π) 1,414.28 0.79 34,620.30 -3,627.48 7,481.72
SE = Shareholder’s equity.
Table 8: Summary of the results after optimizing the expected economic
proﬁt given the possibility of loss due to the lack of liquidity for a volume of
available resources, AL,D, four times bigger.
Result of Average Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation
E(e LF)/AC 0.055896 0.021699 0.482926 0.005647 0.101778
Pf 0.226662 0.151160 0.988160 0.000000 0.222082
E(e Π)/SE 0.002761 0.001395 0.017282 0.000153 0.004006
[E(e Π) − PfE(e Lf)]/SE -0.090973 -0.011487 0.014023 -1.146760 0.249564
PfE(e Lf)/SE 0.097414 0.011046 1.149059 0.000029 0.254890
PfE(e Lf)/E(e Π) 70.95 7.35 499.74 0.03 137.21
SE = Shareholder’s equity.
Table 9: Summary of the results after optimizing the expected economic
proﬁt, without the liquidity constraint, for a volume of available resources,
AL,D, four times bigger.
Finally, the existence of several corner solutions with wL = 1 may indicate
that the punitive rate rp = 1 is not adequate, and the expected losses are
smaller. Thus, a ﬁnal test was performed where E(e Lf) was divided by a
factor (the inverse of rP) so that the average of the optimized wL, weighted
by AL,D, was next to 50%. By dividing the original expected loss by 8.6, what
corresponds to rP ≈ 11.6%, it was possible to obtain an weighted average wL
of 49.9%. On this condition, there were ﬁve interior solutions, two of them
very close to wL = 0, plus three solutions wL = 0. The corner solutions with
wL = 1 amounted to 14. The summary of the optimization results is on table
10.
Result of Average Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation
E(e LF)/AC 0.05484099 0.01923523 0.47205997 0.00564704 0.09949854
Pf 0.21917888 0.17941218 0.98630901 0.00053174 0.22120093
E(e Π)/SE 0.00048934 0.00012914 0.00432062 -0.00003094 0.00104585
[E(e Π) − PfE(e Lf)]/SE -0.01033421 -0.00092684 0.00394163 -0.13035304 0.02839224
PfE(e Lf)/SE 0.01128729 0.00091178 0.13036053 0.00000336 0.02879175
PfE(e Lf)/E(e Π) 718.89 2.21 17,398.98 -2,791.18 3,797.00
SE = Shareholder’s equity.
Table 10: Summary of the optimization results, given the possibility of loss
due to the lack of liquidity and an expected loss 8.6 times smaller.
50When the optimization is performed without considering losses because
of the lack of liquidity, the weighted average of wL drops to 0.81%. The
results are summarized on table 11.
Result of Average Median Maximum Minimum Standard deviation
E(e LF)/AC 0.056773 0.021699 0.482926 0.005647 0.101611
Pf 0.243920 0.179412 0.988160 0.000532 0.223953
E(e Π)/SE 0.000690 0.000349 0.004321 0.000038 0.001002
[E(e Π) − PfE(e Lf)]/SE -0.010882 -0.001263 0.003942 -0.133037 0.029021
PfE(e Lf)/SE 0.012070 0.001669 0.133611 0.000003 0.029558
PfE(e Lf)/E(e Π) 49.28 3.42 421.94 0.01 102.31
SE = Shareholder’s equity.
Table 11: Summary of the optimization results, with an expected loss 8.6
times smaller, and without considering the liquidity restriction.
From tables 10 and 11, the proposed model produces an annual gain on
the return on shareholder’s equity of 0.7%, considering averages, and 0.4%,
considering medians. These results were obtained for rP ≈ 11.6%, and it is
fair to assume that a better assessment of the punitive rate should be a value
higher than the interbank credit rate of about 13.5% a year, what would lead
to yearly gains in the ROE higher than 0.7%.
4 Conclusions
This work introduces a model of liquidity management that uses the consol-
idated and wide spread RAROC and EVA models, resulting in a shot-term
optimal allocation strategy that seamlessly integrates bank wide risks with
little additional eﬀort for those institutions that already use economic proﬁt
models. By maintaining the strategic allocation decision exogenous and the
liquidity cushion decision risk neutral, it was possible to eliminate the need
for arbitrary utility functions and the complexities of properly accounting
for risk throughout all bank operations, and focus on the liquidity manage-
ment decision in order to avoid losses and maximize value to the shareholder.
Risk neutral pricing alternatives were also avoided, despite their theoretical
appeal, because they often assume complete markets with the possibility of
perfect hedge of the liquidity risk, what is not ever the case, specially in less
developed markets, as the Brazilian one, or even in the case of generalized
conﬁdence crisis as the one that is presently occurring due to the problems
with subprime mortgages in United States. At the end, the resulting model
was kept quite simple, with the additional beneﬁt of incorporating the liquid-
ity management to largely used economic proﬁt models. The model proposed
51here presents an evolutive feature that allows for its implementation as a com-
plement of well known practices, consequently, at lower costs and reduced
impacts over current activities and routines.
The suggested liquidity restriction can be applied with any desired level of
complexity, either through parametric or historical simulations. Nevertheless,
a closed form solution, given some simplifying assumptions, was presented
and analyzed thoroughly. The availability of such solution allows for, among
other things, the use of the failure probability by the regulatory authority
as an indicator that helps to monitor a big number of banks at once.27 The
closed form to the failure probability also may be used as a proxy of the real,
but opaque value, allowing for empirical tests related to the funding liquidity
risk. Given the relative scarcity of academic production about optimal liq-
uidity and the relevance of the theme to the stability of the ﬁnancial system
(see Cifuentes et al., 2005), this possibility is another important contribution
of this work. The alternative estimation procedure for the loss given a failure
based on the Extreme Value Theory is also a contribution, even though it
deserves further research.
Finally, it was also presented an empirical assessment of the model using
data from Brazilian banks corresponding to the period from July 2003 to June
2006. Relevant values were found to the failure probability, to the expected
loss and to ROE gains over an optimization that makes no regards to liquidity
risks. The unavailability of more accurate managerial data made it necessary
to use proxies and estimates, what introduced imprecisions that are diﬃcult
to quantify. As a result, it is not possible to assess the signiﬁcance of the
values found. Nevertheless, the proposed model was able to show gains under
several assumptions in robustness tests. There are, therefore, indications
that the model may have relevant impact in liquidity management and value
creation in banks.
27Clearly, given its underling simplifying assumptions, this indicator should be used in
conjunction with others.
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